Tomorrow, Joe Biden will become the forty-sixth President of the United States.
Many governments and individuals around the world breathe a sigh of mutual relief. This will not be because a Democrat has replaced a Republican, but because an individual who represents stability, certainty and rationalism is once again the head of a state of the world’s most influential and economic and powerful military nation.
On the afternoon of January 6 as rebels, terrorists and nihilists enter the US Capitol, Mr Biden spoke as the US President should, showing leadership, prudence, conviction, forward thinking and strength. It was a moment that suggested that US values and democracy might be worthy of respect again.
Now the real challenge begins. In the four years since President Trump took office much has changed in the world, and for the Biden Administration business it can’t be what it was when President Obama dismissed him.
The pandemic apart, the Trump years saw a proliferation of hard and soft wars around the world; rapid acceleration in China’s global influence and economic and military strength; and less powerful nations, including Russia, seek to permanently weaken democratic systems through a mix of misinformation, cyber warfare and inversion. In addition, multilateralism has retreated, multiple refugee crises continue worldwide, and the impact of climate change has become close to critical. All of this has been happening alongside a surge in autocracy, and an expanding global divide between the rich and the average citizen.
One consequence has been a loss of global confidence in US leadership. Faced with weakening alliances, attacks on the multilateral systems that underpin security and trade, and the consequent fragmentation of trust, Washington’s friends in Europe, the Americas and elsewhere have publicly questioned, but mostly privately , were the United States no longer trustworthy allies.
For President Biden and the team of individuals he has chosen for their experience of real-world issues, correcting this is a daunting task, not least in convincing allies that his foreign policy can defeat him.
For America, the new administration has indicated that it will pursue policies that, as their primary objective, secure post-pandemic recovery and economic growth in ways that benefit the entire hemisphere, providing protection for all, including including the US.
Recent interviews, broadcast comments and think tank contributions made by some of those who will hold senior roles in the White House, State Department, and elsewhere, also suggest that the overarching policy principle in the hemisphere will be to promote shared values, cooperation, and change encouraged, rather than driven by the US.
This is likely to be most pronounced in relation to the existential issue of climate change.
It is already clear from John Kerry’s nomination as Mr Biden’s Climate Special Ambassador at a Climate level that tackling global warming will be a cross-cutting theme in future US global and hemispheric policy.
Apart from a much-needed return to the Paris climate agreement, the Biden Administration is expected to mobilize multilateral organizations to develop climate-related post-pandemic solutions that address the unresolved issue of high borrowing costs for vulnerable nations.
In comments made last year, Juan Gonzalez, who has appointed Mr Biden as Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere at the National Security Council, in the Caribbean suggested the use of Mr Biden’s proposed Clean Energy Export and Climate Investment Initiative is likely to be a priority, with an initial focus on providing low-cost funding to small island states ‘ready to show leadership on climate change’.
On the highly divisive issue of Venezuela and Cuba, the incoming administration will continue to press for change in both countries, but with clear objectives and abandon the Trump administration’s divisive attempt to create a ‘ready-made coalition’ Caribbean.
In the case of Venezuela the new approach appears to involve reviewing and adjusting sanctions while encouraging the development of a common approach with Europe, Latin America, and other international partners. This is likely to include the adoption of calibrated ‘sanctions’ in a way that encourages internal dialogue between the Venezuela government and its independent opposition with a view to achieving home-led democratic change,
As for Cuba, though the issue has been complicated by the disgraceful decision taken in the dying days of the Trump administration to re-designate it as the ‘state patron of terrorism’, the Biden White House seems to be easing travel and payment restrictions United States, as part of an incremental strategy that aims, to quote Mr Gonzalez’s previous words, to ’empower the Cuban people as the main characters of their own future’.
For China, the objective of the Biden administration in America is likely to be to play a central coordinating role in the future hemispheric economic development in ways that China cannot. That is by bringing together funding from bodies such as the Inter-American Development Bank and other multilateral organizations, the private sector, and similar allies. This approach is intended to see the United States do more to improve and consolidate economic prosperity across America, using new technologies. As such, the focus will be less on being in close proximity to each other, and not being transactionally open or publicly framed in the context of US national security.
In the coming months, the development of these overarching themes will gradually expand against a backdrop of the more immediate and significant domestic and international concerns that the new administration will have to address.
Already the multitude of Washington think mills and lobbyists floating in Washington’s policy waters are almost assembling the details and informing the April Summit in America where Mr. Biden is expected to outline a new hemispheric policy.
If the Biden Administration truly wants to see the hemisphere take a collegiate approach to policy development and shaping, it is incumbent on Caribbean civil society and especially more thoughtful private sector representatives to develop new working relationships in Washington. It also suggests that this is the moment when there needs to be mechanisms with longevity, beyond the connections that governments may have, which ensure that the legitimate voice of the region’s economic interests are clearly heard.
David Jessop is a consultant to the Caribbean Council and can be contacted at
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