By Nina L. Khrushcheva
MOSCOW – There are arguably two moments in the last century when a wrecking ball was taken into Russian political order. In 1917, the Bolshevik Revolution addressed the provocative monarchy of the country. And, in 1991, an unreasonable collapse by Marxist-Leninist hardliners accelerated against reformer Mikhail Gorbachev in the collapse of the Soviet Union. Does the wave of protests that have swept Russia in recent weeks signal another regime change?
Not likely. To be sure, unlike the protests that Russia staged in 2011-12 in response to Vladimir Putin’s third inauguration as president, the protest movement today has a charismatic and sympathetic leader. Alexei Navalny has not only been a tireless anti-corruption advocate for years; when he was arrested last month, he had just returned from Germany – where he had spent months recovering, after being poisoned with the Kremlin’s favorite nerve agent, Novichok – to continue to face the Putin regime.
But, unlike the twilight of the czars and the Soviets, the Putin regime does not provoke or topple. Putin has spent the last decade consolidating a police state, and is ready to use every available tool to retain power. The leader who invaded Ukraine and annexed the Crimea illegally in 2014 to strengthen his founder approval rating, and who secured a constitutional amendment last year so he could remain president for life, is not about to be forced into power by an organization of weekend protesters.
And yet, there is something particularly exaggerated, even irrational, about Putin’s suspension of Navalny, his associates, and his supporters. Already, law enforcement officers have detained thousands (including journalists), often using cruel tactics. The government has also blocked social media platforms, because they are supposed to spark unrest.
Meanwhile, the Kremlin-controlled television networks broadcast endless retreat stories about Putin, and every effort is being made to defy the protest movement. By effectively closing the center of Moscow, including public transport that led to it, the government has inconvenienced many citizens – and made it seem Navalny’s fault. The government wants “peaceful city dwellers” to be able to do their weekend shopping, the narrative goes, but the protesters “who break the law”, much like “terrorists,” insist on disrupting “normal” life.
According to the Kremlin’s logic, when foreign leaders, journalists and diplomats speak out in support of the opposition, they only prove that Navalny is the fact of a global conspiracy to destabilize Russia. To drive this point home, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs recently expelled three European diplomats for attending Navalny rallies – while Josep Borrell, the EU’s senior representative for foreign affairs and security policy, visits Moscow, none the less. .
The Kremlin treats Navalny itself accordingly – as an enemy of the state. Navalny farce court hearings since his return from Germany recall the trials of Stalin’s show in the 1930s, with one key difference: Navalny does not cap the dictator by admitting his “crimes.” During the proceedings, Navalny reprimanded state law and denied his sentence – nearly three years in punitive colonization – as unlawful.
Furthermore, Navalny recently released a viral video accusing Putin of using fraudulently secured funds to build a billion-dollar palace on the Black Sea. While Russians expect their leaders to be corrupt, Navalny consistently provides a perspective on the extent of wealth that corruption produces. (He did the same with his 2017 investigation of then Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev.)
Navalny’s attacks thus directly undermine Putin. In this sense, Navalny is not like one of Stalin’s Trotskyist targets; he is Trotsky himself. And it needs cleaning.
Putin’s fears are exacerbated by the possibility that a slow-moving palace coup might be unfolding. Since the annexation of Crimea, Western sanctions have been choking the Russian economy, sparking resentment among the country’s political elites, who yearn for access to their Swiss bank accounts and Italian villas. They may now seek to replace Putin, in the same way that Nikita Khrushchev was installed in 1964. And a diminutive Putin would probably be much easier to demolish than a popular one.
The emergence of mystics and proselytizers with promises of clarity offers further evidence that Russia’s ossified regime is beginning to destroy itself. Grigori Rasputin, a self proclaimed holy man, helped to drive the decaying imperial monarchy to earth. In the 1980s, when the Soviet empire was beyond reform, television psychiatrists were all the rage.
Today, political shamans of all stripes – from the communist to the nationalist – are rising to prominence. They anticipate Putin’s imminent death, warn of Western or Chinese occupation, and speculate that Navalny was a project of Russian security services that got out of hand. Some have even interpreted Navalny’s name – which translates as “push away” – as a sign that he is the one who will drive Putinism out.
Nevertheless, as the Kremlin’s response to the protests has shown, Putin and the state are the same. That makes it a particularly difficult proposition – for the time being at least.
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2021.
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