Constitutional reform: a neutral public service

‘(The) dominant political elements in Guyana and the resulting reality are that governments prefer not to have neutral or neutered public servants but those who are among their enthusiastic and active supporters. Once this pattern is established, it is practically difficult to delete, modify or change it. ‘

The above comment comes from the Guyana Public Service Inquiry (COI) report, set up by the APNU + AFC government and chaired by Professor Harold Lutchman, and applies at a time when APNU + AFC opposition was in parliament. complains of questionable dismissals of public servants by the new PPP / C government. However, this argument is only the result of conduct obtained from the observation, which suggests that the Westminster-like public arrangements are inappropriate for countries such as Guyana. I was invited to make a presentation to the COI because of some statements I made in ‘When party governance confounded good governance’ (SN 02/09/2015).

In that article, I argued that Guyana’s traditional public service arrangements originated in a similar system to Westminster in Britain where civil servants must serve their political masters, be impartial about party politics and ministerial policies and should not get into the political fraud. Ministers must not ask civil servants to perform political tasks. Appointment and promotion in the civil service should not involve political considerations or be affected by change in government. Even parliamentary committees should not ask civil servants questions about political controversy. Ministers, not public servants, should publicly defend departmental policy. The advice that civil servants give to their ministers is confidential and they should not be required to disclose it publicly. Parliamentary committees must not ask questions about the conduct of certain civil servants or the advice they give to their ministers. This kind of environment is absent in Guyana and I concluded that the solution to the longstanding dilemmas identified by the COI was not technical but political and therefore outside its remit.

In its skilfully researched and well-presented report, the COI reminded that, within the ideological framework of Westminster and the Guyana Constitution, the Public Services Commission (PSC) had, ‘… the power to make appointments to public offices and to obtain remove and discipline discipline over persons holding positions or in such offices. ‘Moreover, according to article 200 (1) of the constitution,’ The Public Services Commission will consist of six members appointed as follows. ‘a) Three members appointed by the Presiding Officer acting in consultation with the Leader of the Opposition, b) Two members appointed by the Presiding Officer after nomination by the National Assembly after consultation with those bodies which appear to him to represent public officials or classes of public officials and c) If the President deems it fit one other member appointed by the President acting in accordance with his own deliberate decree. ‘

The COI went on to direct its attention to the current configuration of the PSC to determine whether it ‘contains the best collection of people who are competent and successful in carrying out the role assigned to it in the Constitution.’ Given his opening observation, it is not surprising that he generally found that he did not and ‘recommended that the PSC should be composed of highly qualified and competent individuals with high integrity to exercise their duties in strict fairness, impartiality, and basis of merit. It is desirable, as in the case of the Public Services Appeals Tribunal, that Commission members should have experience and competence in matters relating to administration, human resource management or public affairs. ‘In effect, despite its observation, the COI asks the politicians who have shown over decades that their priority is to get their own supporters in strategic positions not to do so in the interests of constitutional compliance similar to Westminster !

Again, the COI recognized that the constitution protects workers ‘rights and that article 147’ (3) protects the right to collective bargaining and … neither employer nor trade unions should be deprived of the right to collective bargaining . ‘ He noted that the Guyana Public Service Union (GPSU) is the legally recognized majority trade union in the public service and recommended that ‘Collective Bargaining with the GPSU and the relevant Public Authorities be restored. ” [and that] the Public Authorities and GPSU return to collective bargaining through the established, institutional and procedural arrangements in accordance with the principles of goodwill in collective bargaining, and consistent with the provisions of the ratified ILO Convention No. 151 on Affiliations Labor in the Public Service. ‘As noted above, as we speak the Opposition complains of wrongful dismissal of workers by the PPP / C in part to allow it to replace its supporters. When APNU + AFC came to government it was following the tradition set by the PPP / C in these and other areas, eg it stopped collective bargaining and probably the whole COI report!

John Maynard Keynes famously said, ‘Practical men who think they are quite exempt from any intellectual influence, are usually slaves to some extinct economist / (political theorists). Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, distilled their frenzy from some academic scribe a few years ago. ‘The constitutional directive to the PSC and the construction of the PSC contains a huge problem that the COI would not comment on unless I lost it, but only the kind of reliance that Keynes suggested in relation to a Westminster political culture that could be properly explained. Throughout Guyana’s post-independence history, its politicians prefer to be (not) neutral or neutered public servants but those who are among their enthusiastic and active supporters. ‘Yet, the constitution gives the president a legal opportunity to determine the entire membership of the PSC. After all, ‘consultation’ is not a treaty, the Guyana National Assembly is a majority tool that the president is a creature of himself and that is exactly ‘his own deliberate opinion’! This is especially important where it is most likely that those people who prefer politicians to be in operation ‘will be their ethnicity!

However, the Keynesian dependence gives way when thoughts focus on self-interest and less so on the more familiar but vital pillars of society. Guyana’s post-independence constitutional history is arguably a significant reversal of the Westminster political system: only that what is left is coupled with the innovations in a way that makes the system more toxic! Second, the president and leader of the opposition are required to agree the appointment of the chancellor of the judiciary and the chief justice. The difficulty with this arrangement stems primarily from the drafters failing to establish a tie breaker mechanism.

There is a fundamental constitutional need, including public service, reforms and in relation to the latter there is a need to rethink the whole system. Guyana is a severely fractured society, where presidents and governments are fundamentally unresponsive and not considered to represent entire citizenship. The Westminster drawing cannot be forced into a situation where over 80 per cent of the population, by their actions over decades, is not adhered to by political representatives. An effective public service must be contextualised with clear and transparent employment methods for an ongoing reassessment of the required mix of skills and competencies. Defensive constitutional mechanisms such as those that avoid a decision that adversely affect the essential interests of ethnic groups are common in divided societies and should be given greater importance in a future process of reform.

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