Where is the US Foreign Policy? – Stabroek News

NEW YORK – Joe Biden has been president of the United States for only a few weeks, but the central elements of his approach to the world are already clear: rebuilding at home, working with allies, embracing diplomacy, participating in international organizations, and advocating for democracy . . All of this puts him squarely in the tradition of post-World War II American foreign policy that was succeeded by his predecessor, Donald Trump.

In his State Department’s first foreign policy speech on February 4, Biden declared “America is back.” He stressed that Secretary of State Tony Blinken spoke for him and went to great lengths to support American diplomats and diplomacy.

Biden also announced that he would suspend any withdrawal of the US armed forces from Germany, as Trump had ordered, probably to help restore NATO members’ confidence in US security guarantees and to sign to Russian President Vladimir Putin should not try to use foreign adventures to distract from domestic protests.

On Saudi Arabia, Biden walked a nice line. The United States distanced itself from military and intelligence support for the war in Yemen, explaining how U.S. involvement from now on would be diplomatic and humanitarian. At the same time, he made it clear that the Saudis were not alone in facing Iran. Squaring this round will be far from easy, especially given the added complexity of US disagreements with Saudi leaders over their poor human rights record.

Biden’s ability to succeed in the world will be constrained by several factors, many inherited. America’s ability to effectively advocate for democracy has diminished much following the Jan. 6 uprising at the US Capitol, and in light of the country’s polar politics, endemic racism, and Trump’s year of inertial coverage of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The good news is that progress on tackling the pandemic and its economic outcome is already being seen. The bad news is that the political and social divisions of the country are bound to suffer. Biden likes to say that America will lead by the power of his example, but it may be a long time before that example is one that the world admires again.

Biden further reinforced humanitarian concerns by promising to open the country’s doors to a much larger number of refugees. What could also help would be to make available a significant number of doses of COVID-19 vaccines to the developing world. This would not only be morally correct, but also for American self-interest, as it would slow down the emergence of mutations that threaten the effectiveness of existing vaccines. It would also help countries everywhere to improve, leading to widespread economic recovery and, ultimately, fewer refugees.

Although Biden is right to criticize Russia and China for violating the rule of law, he cannot force their hand. Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping are willing to pay the price of sanctions to maintain political control, and the United States cannot hold the entire relationship of either country’s hostage to human rights. It must consider other vital interests, a reality underlined by the Biden administration’s decision to sign a five-year extension of the New START nuclear agreement with Russia.

A similar reality (the need for help vis-à-vis North Korea just to mention one) will limit the amount of pressure the US can exert on China over its behavior in Hong Kong or towards its Uighur minority in Xinjiang. And even where Biden can place the rule of law at the center of US policy – say, in Myanmar – he may find that governments can resist, especially if they have outside help. All of this raises questions about the wisdom of making the promotion of democracy so central to US foreign policy.

China’s policy will prove easier to express than its implementation. Biden voiced strong criticism of Chinese behavior, but also noted a desire to work with Xi’s regime when it is in America’s interest to do so. China will have to decide if it is ready to retrofit in the face of criticism, sanctions, and export restrictions on US sensitive technology.

Similarly, the US will struggle to meet its goal of organizing the world to meet global challenges, from infectious disease and climate change to proliferation and nuclear behavior in cyberspace. There is no consensus and no international community, and the US cannot force others to act the way it wants or succeed alone.

Many difficult decisions remain. The Biden administration will need to decide what to do about Iran’s nuclear ambitions (and whether to rejoin the 2015 nuclear agreement that many observers consider to be flawed). There are also questions about what to do with the treaty signed a year ago with the Taliban – not so much a peace treaty as a cover-up for the withdrawal of the U.S. military – and about a regime in North Korea that n continue to expand its nuclear arsenals and missiles.

However, Biden’s foreign policy is shaping up, it is important that it be twofold and involve Congress whenever possible. U.S. allies are understandably afraid that Americans could return to Trumpism in four years, if not the man himself. The fear that Trump was not an aberration, but rather a reflection of what the United States has become, undermines US influence. The temptation to govern by executive action is understandable, but in foreign policy, Biden should seek to revive the principle that domestic politics stops at the water’s edge.

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